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QUESTION PRESENTED 
This brief addresses the importance of the principle 
of church autonomy and the protections provided 
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and this 
Court's precedents regarding religious denominations' 
internal mandatory dispute-resolution procedures. 
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INTEREST OF Al\DCP 
Amicus curiae The Catholic University of America 
is the national university of the Catholic Church in 
the United States, founded and sponsored by the 
bishops of the country with the approval of the 
Holy See. Located in Washington, D.C., it has 
around 3, 700 undergraduate and over 3,000 graduate 
students from fifty states and eighty-six countries. 
These students do course work in one or more of its 
twelve schools, one of which is its School of Canon 
Law. The School of Canon Law along with two other 
ecclesiastical faculties (philosophy and theology) can 
grant licentiate and doctorate degrees authorized by 
the Holy See. 
The School of Canon Law is the only school or faculty 
of canon law in the United States. The School's 
instruction, under the authority of the Congregation 
for Catholic Education, familiarizes students with 
the Catholic Church's 1983 Code of Canon Law and 
its development, interpretation, and application. Its 
courses prepare priests, nuns, and laypersons for the 
professional practice of canon law in diocesan and 
religious administration, in ecclesiastical tribunals, 
and in researching and teaching canon law. Catholic 
University's School of Canon Law awards two 
ecclesiastical degrees: the licentiate in canon law 
(J.C.L.) and doctor of canon law (J.C.D.). These 
degrees prepare the students to recognize that 
Catholics belong to two distinct legal systems: as 
citizens, they are subject to civil (secular) law; as 
1 This brief was prepared entirely by amici and their counsel. 
No other person made any financial contribution to its prepara-
tion or submission. Counsel of record received timely notice of 
the intent to file this brief and have consented to its filing. 
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Catholics, they are subject to divine and ecclesiastical 
law. The distinctions between the two systems of 
law and the proper spheres of each are of great 
importance. 
Graduates of Catholic University's School of Canon 
Law serve in a substantial percentage of the almost 
200 diocesan tribunals in the United States and 
also in many of the over thirty appellate tribunals 
overseen by metropolitan archbishops in the United 
States. Because of the experience of educating these 
graduates and consulting with them regarding their 
work, few Catholic institutions are better situated 
to understand the critically important work of 
ecclesiastical tribunals in the administration of the 
Catholic Church in the United States. 
The 1983 Code of Canon Law is the universal law 
for the entire Latin rite of the Roman Catholic Church. 
It is in force for dioceses and parishes in the United 
States. It is both a theological and a juridical disci-
pline. It has drawn from Roman law, Sacred Scrip-
ture, and the experience of a society based on faith. Its 
primary purpose is to assist all members of the Church 
in the proclamation of the Gospel and the salvation of 
souls. 
Accordingly, secular courts have neither the compe-
tence nor authority to dictate the administration or 
procedure for Catholic Church diocesan or appellate 
tribunals. These tribunals must adhere to procedures 
certain of which have historical roots going back 
centuries. Denominations must be free to oversee and 
direct their own tribunals in accordance with Scrip-
ture, tradition, and learned experience. Catholic 
University has joined this amicus brief to help protect 
this First Amendment freedom. 
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Amicus curiae The Lutheran Church - Missouri 
Synod ("The Synod"), a Missouri nonprofit corporation, 
has some 6,150 member congregations with 2,200,000 
baptized members throughout the United States. The 
Synod steadfastly adheres to orthodox Lutheran theol-
ogy and practice, and among its beliefs is the Biblical 
teaching that Christians should resolve their disputes 
promptly and internally without going to the secular 
courts for relief (See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 6:1-8; 
Matthew 5:23-24; Ephesians 4:26-27; Philippians. 
2:5). The Synod has emphasized the importance of this 
biblical teaching and over the years has developed 
detailed procedures for the resolution of controversies 
within the church. All member congregations, or-
dained and commissioned ministers, and certain others 
listed in the Synod Bylaws are subject to mandatory 
internal dispute resolution as the exclusive means of 
resolving their differences with one another, with a 
few exceptions. Disputes over property or contractual 
rights are considered purely temporal matters falling 
outside of the Synod's purview, unless such matters 
involve theological, doctrinal, or ecclesiastical issues, 
including those arising under the divine call of a 
member of the Synod. Thus, the Synod's dispute 
resolution practice is not like Petitioner's with respect 
to property disputes. Nonetheless, the Synod supports 
Petitioner's position because the Synod has a fervent 
interest in fully protecting and maintaining the 
religious freedom and liberties afforded under the 
United States Constitution and re-affirmed in this 
Court's recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012), which involved one of the Synod's member 
congregations. 
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Amicus curiae The Queens Federation Churches, 
Inc., was organized in 1931 and is an ecumenical 
association of Christian churches located in the 
Borough of Queens, City of New York. It is governed 
by a Board of Directors composed of equal number of 
clergy and lay members elected by the delegates of 
member congregations at an annual assembly meet-
ing. It relates to over 900 local churches representing 
every major Christian denomination and many 
independent congregations in Queens County, many of 
which have internal judicial processes and would 
be adversely affected by an inability to enforce 
ecclesiastical judgments. The Queens Federation of 
Churches has appeared as amicus curiae previously in 
a variety of actions to serve the cause of justice. The 
Queens Federation of Churches and its member 
congregations are vitally concerned that religious 
liberty be protected. 
Amicus curiae The Serbian Orthodox Church in 
North and South America (SOCNSA) is a geographic 
region of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is 
one of the fourteen autocephalous/self-governing, 
hierarchical/episcopal churches which comprise the 
Orthodox Christian Church, commonly referred to as 
the Eastern Orthodox Church. Within the Eastern 
Orthodox Church, the Serbian Orthodox Church has 
the rank of Patriarchate, and its position of honor is 
sixth, following the Patriarchates of Constantinople, 
Antioch, Alexandria, Jerusalem, and Russia. The 
territory of the SOCNSA covers five Serbian Orthodox 
Dioceses, each headed by its own Bishop/Hierarch 
appointed by the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate: New 
Gracanica-Midwestern America; Eastern America; 
Western America; Canada; and South and Central 
America. These dioceses together comprise over 200 
parishes, 14 monasteries, a School of Theology in 
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Libertyville, Illinois, and other institutions which, led 
by the SOCNSA's local Episcopal/Bishop's Council, 
administer the Holy Mysteries/Sacraments and 
educate and minister to the over 750,000 persons of 
Serbian descent who live in the Western Hemisphere 
and to the other Orthodox Christians who have chosen 
to accept the omophorion/jurisdiction of the Serbian 
Orthodox Patriarchate. 
The SOCNSA is submitting this amicus brief be-
cause the SOCNSA knows, through its own difficult 
experience, recounted in this Court's landmark 
decision, Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for USA 
and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), how 
critically important it is for any church or denomina-
tion to exercise authority over those who minister in 
its name, the manner by which it resolves ecclesiasti-
cal disputes and administers its own tribunals, and 
the way in which it holds church property as part of 
the patrimony of the church. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its particulars, this case is about a property 
dispute in Michigan and the application of that state's 
statute of limitations. However, it is also about the 
separation of church and state-an arrangement that 
is sometimes misunderstood and the details of which 
are debated but which is nevertheless a critical 
dimension of the religious freedom reflected in, and 
protected by, the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
to our Constitution. 
Throughout the long tradition of Western constitu-
tionalism, the project of protecting political freedom 
by marking the boundaries to the power of 
government has been assisted by the principled 
commitment to church-state separation, correctly 
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understood. See generally, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, 
LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983). A political commu-
nity that respects - as ours does - the important 
distinction between the spheres of political and 
religious authority is one in which the fundamental 
rights of all are more secure; a government that 
acknowledges this distinction and the limits to its own 
reach is one that will more consistently protect and 
vindicate the liberties of both individuals and 
institutions. See generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, 
"The Freedom of the Church": (Toward) An Exposition, 
Translation, and Defense, in MICAH SCHWARTZMAN, 
CHAD FLANDERS & ZOE ROBINSON, EDS., THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2016). 
The religious-freedom-protecting principle of church 
-state separation has long meant, among other things, 
that religious communities and institutions enjoy 
meaningful autonomy and independence with respect 
to their governance, structures, rituals, and teachings. 
As Professor Douglas Laycock influentially put it 
thirty-five years ago, "churches have a constitutionally 
protected interest in managing their own institutions 
free of government interference." Douglas Laycock, 
Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 
(1981). This autonomy has been recognized and 
vindicated in a long line and wide array of this Court's 
decisions and is entirely consistent with the appro-
priate exercise of the civil authorities' regulatory and 
other powers. Indeed, this Court recently and unani-
mously reaffirmed as much in the landmark Hosanna-
Tabor case, which recalled the "spirit of freedom for 
religious organizations, an independence from secular 
control or manipulation-in short, power to decide for 
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themselves, free from state interference, matters 
of church government as well as those of faith 
and doctrine." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 565 U.S. _ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 
(2014) (quoting Kedroffv. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of 
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 
94, 116 (1952)). 
It is precisely this "power to decide" that is 
implicated in this case. The question presented by 
Petitioner-"whether the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments require tolling of a state statute of 
limitations while denomination members diligently 
pursue the denomination's mandatory dispute resolu-
tion procedure," Pet. at i-goes to the implications and 
demands of our constitutional commitment to the 
autonomy of and the "spirit of freedom for religious 
organizations." Justices Kagan and Alito, in their 
concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor, observed that 
"[t]o protect this crucial autonomy, we have long 
recognized that the Religion Clauses protect a private 
sphere within which religious bodies are free to govern 
themselves in accord with their own beliefs." 
Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 712 (Alito & Kagan, JJ., 
concurring). However, religious communities are not 
truly and meaningfully "free to govern themselves" if 
their internal juridical and dispute-resolution proce-
dures are not accorded reasonable respect and 
deference by the secular authorities. It is important 
for this Court to clarify the implications of its 
church-autonomy precedents-including Hosanna-
Tabor, supra; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); 
Serbian East Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in United States 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); and Kedroff v. Saint 
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Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)-for the 
interaction between religious denominations' dispute-
resol ution and disciplinary procedures and the 
application in civil litigation of statutes of limitations. 
ARGUMENT 
As Professor Gerard Bradley has observed, "church 
autonomy"-that is, the "issue that arises when legal 
principles displace religious communities' internal 
rules of interpersonal relations"-is the "flagship issue 
of church and state" and the "litmus test of a regime's 
commitment to genuine spiritual freedom." Gerard V. 
Bradley, Forum Juridicum: Church Autonomy in the 
Constitutional Order, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1061 (1987). 
This "flagship issue" is implicated in this case and its 
importance warrants this Court's review. 
I. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROTECTED 
BY THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS IS ENJOYED BY RELIG-
IOUS INSTITUTIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, 
COMMUNITIES, AND DENOMINATIONS 
Petitioner Chabad-Lubavitch of Michigan is a 
religious society. And, notwithstanding the confusion 
sometimes on display in public debates about 
"corporations" and their rights, it is well established 
and beyond dispute that the constitutional right to 
freedom of religion belongs not only to individuals, but 
also to institutions, associations, communities, and 
congregations. See generally, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 
supra; Michael W. McConnell, Refiections on 
Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL 'y 821, 836 
(2012). Just as every person has the right to seek 
religious truth and to cling to it when it is found, 
religious communities have the right to hold and teach 
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their own doctrines; just as every person ought to be 
free from official coercion when it comes to religious 
practices or professions, religious institutions are 
entitled to govern themselves, and to exercise appro-
priate authority, free from official interference; just as 
every person has the right to select the religious 
teachings he will embrace, churches have the right to 
select the ministers they will ordain. 
Justice William Douglas observed in his dissenting 
opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder that "religion is an 
individual experience." 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). It certainly is, but it 
is not only that. After all, as Justice William Brennan 
reminded us, "[f]or many individuals, religious activity 
derives meaning in large measure from participation 
in a larger religious community. Such a community 
represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an 
organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of 
individuals." Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 
U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring). These 
"organic entities" are subjects, not just results or by-
products, of religious liberty. And, by virtue of and 
through the exercise of their own religious-freedom 
rights, religious institutions play an important 
structural, checking role and provide added security to 
the rights and liberties of individual persons. See 
generally, Richard W. Garnett, Religious Liberty, 
Church Autonomy, and the Structure of Freedom, in 
JOHN WITTE, JR. & FRANKS. ALEXANDER, CHRISTIAN-
ITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (2010); cf. 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 
(1984) (observing that the rights of expressive assoc-
iations are "especially important in preserving polit-
ical and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident 
expression from suppression by the majority"). 
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Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to the full scope 
of religious freedom protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ENCOMPASSES 
THE INTERNAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION 
PROCEDURES OF RELIGIOUS DENOMI-
NATIONS 
The principle of "separation of church and state" is, 
as was noted earlier, controversial in some of its 
applications, but there is a long tradition and broad 
consensus in favor of institutional separation between 
religious and political authority and jurisdiction. See 
generally, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and 
Other) Safeguards of Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1815 (2011); Thomas C. Berg, Kimberlee Wood 
Colby, Carl H. Esbeck, & Richard W. Garnett, 
Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation & the 
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
175 (2011). That is, in our laws and traditions, the 
institutions of the state are distinct from the 
institutions of the church and neither can exercise the 
functions of the other. The concept of "separation of 
church and state," as it has developed and evolved in 
the United States, "denote[s] a structural arrange-
ment involving institutions, a constitutional order in 
which the institutions of religion ... are distinct from, 
other than, and meaningfully independent of, the 
institutions of government." Richard W. Garnett, 
Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like 
the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COMM. 515, 523 
(2007). 
Turning to the text of the First Amendment, the 
"establishment" of religion that is prohibited by that 
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provision refers not only to official sponsorship or 
financial support but also to "active involvement of 
the sovereign in religious activity." Walz v. Tax 
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). It is clear that 
the institutional separation of church and state means 
that the law may not delegate core governmental 
functions to churches, see, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's 
Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982), and the complemen-
tary principle is equally clear: Government may not 
insert itself into controversies over the ecclesiastical 
decisions of religious organizations, either by second-
guessing the substance of those decisions or by inter-
fering with the processes by which those decisions are 
reached. AB this Court has long recognized, a key com-
ponent of religious freedom and church-state separa-
tion is the autonomy of religious organizations over 
matters of internal governance and dispute resolution. 
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728-29 (1872) 
(noting "unquestioned" right in America of "voluntary 
religious associations" to decide "controverted ques-
tions of faith" and matters of "ecclesiastical govern-
ment"); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (recognizing that the 
First Amendment respects religious organizations' 
"power to decide for themselves ... matters of church 
government as well as those of faith and doctrine"); 
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (observing that the First 
Amendment does not permit civil courts to resolve 
disputes involving "controversies over religious doc-
trine and practice"); Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and 
Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the 
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1389 
(2004) (noting that "the doctrine of church autonomy" 
is a "recognition" that "the civil courts have no subject 
12 
matter jurisdiction over the internal affairs of 
religious organizations"). 
Chabad-Lubavitch of Michigan-like many other 
religious institutions and societies from a wide range 
of religious traditions-has, as a matter of religious 
commitment and obligation, an established, manda-
tory, internal dispute-resolution process. AB the Court 
of Appeals observed below, "[t]he parties do not 
dispute that Chabad-Lubavitch religious doctrine and 
polity require internal dispute resolution by means of 
one of various rabbinic judicial panels or courts." Pet. 
App. 6. "Permission to file a lawsuit in a civic, secular 
court is required before a dispute may be taken outside 
the religious organization." Ibid. Therefore, an official 
rule, policy, or action that interferes with, under-
mines, revises, nullifies, or penalizes this dispute-
resolution process at least implicates Petitioner's 
religious-freedom rights which are protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. See generally, 
e.g., Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 493 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Church 
Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J. L. & PuB. PoL'Y 253 
(2009). 
Despite this clear implication of Petitioner's 
constitutional religious-freedom rights, the Michigan 
Supreme Court has in effect declared, without 
supporting analysis, that the Constitution of the 
United States provides no basis for equitably tolling 
that state's statute of limitations. Such a startling 
determination warrants this Court's review. 
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III. HONORING THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS DENOMI-
NATIONS CAN REQUIRE EQUITABLE 
TOLLING OF STATE STATUTES OF 
LIMITATIONS TO ACCOMMODATE 
INTERNAL DISPUTE-RESOLUTION 
PROCEDURES 
Petitioner argued below that the application of the 
statute of limitations-specifically, a failure to apply 
equitable tolling in light of the religiously mandated 
internal dispute-resolution proceedings-undermines 
those proceedings, unduly and needlessly burdens the 
denomination's religious-freedom rights, and there-
fore violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Court of Appeals addressed these arguments 
below; the Michigan Supreme Court, in its May 20, 
2015 Order, did not. Instead, the latter court stated 
without explanation that "there are no grounds on 
which to equitably toll the statute of limitations" and 
observed that the relevant "statutory scheme is 
exclusive, and [does not] contain[] a provision to toll 
the period oflimitations." Pet. App. 1-2. 
However, as this Court recognized in Hosanna-
Tabor, the Constitution extends and requires "special 
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations." 132 
S. Ct. at 706. Just as the First Amendment requires, 
in some cases, exempting religious institutions' hiring 
and firing decisions from otherwise applicable non-
discrimination and employment-related statutes, it 
should also be understood to require appropriate 
equitable tolling of a statute of limitations in order to 
permit the exhaustion of religiously mandated 
internal dispute-resolution proceedings. "In a lawsuit 
that strikes at the ability of the church to govern the 
church, any balancing of interests between a [sincere 
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secular interest or purpose], on the one hand, and 
institutional religious freedom, on the other, is a 
balance already struck." Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious 
Organization's Autonomy in Matters of Self-Govern-
ance: Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 
13 Engage 114, 114 (2012). Indeed, as this Court put 
it in Hosanna-Tabor, "the First Amendment [strikes] 
the balance for us." 132 S. Ct. at 710. In order 
to prevent establishment and protect free exercise, 
the freedom of religious institutions will, in some 
cases, prevail over even the most "worthy" goals of 
government when those goals threaten to invade that 
sacred sphere. Id. at 712 (Alita, J., concurring). 
Because "[a]ll who unite themselves to [a religious] 
body do so with an implied consent to [its] government 
and are bound to submit to it ... [it] would lead to the 
total subversion of religious bodies, if any one 
aggrieved by one of their decisions" could have the 
decision reversed by a secular court. Kedroff, 344 U.S. 
at 114-15. In the same way, allowing a party to take 
advantage of ecclesiastical adjudication (both by 
initiating proceedings and agreeing to be bound by the 
decision)-knowing that a long enough period of 
nonconformity would be subject to a comprehensive 
review and eventually nullified by arbitrary applica-
tion of civil procedure-would lead to the subversion 
of that religious autonomy which "the Religion 
Clauses guarantee." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 710 
(Thomas, J., concurring). It is, after all, foundational 
that we should "not wish a plaintiff deprived of his 
rights when no policy underlying a statute of 
limitations is served in doing so[.]" Burnett v. New 
York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434 (1965). 
This Court has seen fit to equitably toll state 
statutes of limitations when federal constitutional 
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rights are at stake. In this case, Petitioner is merely 
invoking a well-established and sound principle. 
CONCLUSION 
To borrow from Justice Frankfurter, "what is at 
stake here is the power to exercise religious 
authority." Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 121 (1952) (Frankfur-
ter, J., concurring). Given the importance of the ques-
tion presented, across the country and especially for 
the many religious communities and institutions 
whose doctrine mandates their internal dispute 
mechanisms be exhausted prior to pursuing civil 
remedies, this Court should grant the petition for writ 
of certiorari and reverse the judgment below. 
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